

MYSTICISM, QUAKERISM, AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL REPLY TO R. A. NAULTY*

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After reaffirming previous comments concerning the psychological reductionism of William James' interpretation of mysticism, this article, like its predecessor, concludes that early Quakerism and other forms of 'mystical' expressions are best interpreted as products of their cultures. Feelings of collectively-held relative deprivation frequently provide the social stimuli that lead people to believe that they have direct experiences of God or a transcendent reality.

Rarely do sociologists of religion and religious studies scholars discuss their differing views on mysticism, even though this (presumed) phenomenon plays a pivotal role in the processes of both spiritual and social life. On a professional basis these sets of academics usually belong to different scholarly organizations and societies, and as a result present papers to their own professional audiences. Likewise, sociologists of religion and religious studies personnel maintain independent academic journals, and most of us have our hands full simply trying to stay caught up in our own areas. I am sensitive to the issue of poor communication between the two groups because my academic appointments have been in sociology departments even though all of my advanced academic degrees are in religious studies. R. A. Naulty's informed comments on my paper, therefore, initiate an unusual opportunity to discuss a topic of considerable importance to both sociologists and religionists.¹ Naulty's article prompted me to re-examine my interpretation of James, but I stand firm on it as well as on the conclusion that Quakerism, and by extension, other forms of mysticism, are best *interpreted* as products of their cultures. Within particular cultures, collective feelings of relative deprivation frequently provide social stimuli that lead people to believe that they have direct experiences of either God or a transcendent reality.

Naulty does an accurate job of highlighting my basic claims. Naulty indicates correctly that: (1) I charged James with psychological reductionism;² (2) I advanced the position that recent interpretations of early Quakerism

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have diminished (if not ignored) earlier claims about Quakerism's mystical roots (i.e. that it was the result of people's 'direct experience of God');³ (3) in place of these mystical claims, I proposed that early Quakerism be viewed as the result of social-psychological pressures that were unique to a particular period in English history.⁴ Furthermore, Naulty identifies my position (in order to challenge it) that (4) the established social psychological concept of relative deprivation provides an adequate explanation of the early Quakers' (alleged) mysticism;⁵ and (5) this theory probably explains other cases of mysticism as well.⁶ I will address each of our points of dispute in turn, and I will conclude my reply to Naulty with some reflective comments on the relationship of sociology to the study of religious mysticism.

First, however, let me go right to the heart of the matter. By referring to the Quakers' mysticism as 'reputed' and 'alleged', am I in fact denying that it was real—am I denying that it actually occurred? Am I making a similar denial when I indicate that the best view of Quakerism comes after locating its members' mystical claims within the specific socio-cultural context of Interregnum England? The simple fact is that, on philosophical grounds, I cannot make such a bold denial. If there is (a) God, and if God speaks or reveals Itself to people, then maybe It often does so to persons who feel disprivileged by their social circumstances. While this scenario is philosophically possible, it holds no promise as a methodological research strategy. It is a statement of faith, not of science. A researcher cannot blindly accept people's claims of divine revelation, since no irrefutable and exclusive evidence can ever be mustered in their support.

A more *plausible* explanation of mysticism, and one that is wholly defensible on social scientific grounds, identifies it as a human expression of the mystics' socio-cultural location and experience. From this secular, socio-cultural perspective we acquire the analytic tools to study the human conditions that foster mysticism's expression, and therefore have no reason to dislocate causal explanations into a realm of the supramundane. The compelling logic and the resultant findings of social scientific investigations provide interpretations that many people accept as conceptually adequate unto themselves, and as a result the proponents of supernatural mysticism feel both threatened and uncomfortable. If a threat to both religious studies and faith lies in social scientific explanations of mysticism, then it derives as much from the methodological weakness of divine explanations as from the strength of secular ones.

JAMES, MYSTICISM, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM

To resolve the question (if it can be settled) of James' possible reduction of mysticism to psychology, two separate tasks must be performed. First, we must agree upon what James himself believed about mysticism and

psychology, and then we must determine how James translated this belief into the contents of his Gifford Lectures (and subsequently into *The Varieties of Religious Experience*).

Perhaps the clearest statement that James made of his personal belief about mysticism and psychology appears in a letter that he composed on 16 June 1901, the day before he was to give his tenth lecture. Written to Henry W. Rankin, it is of especial interest as it contains James' rejection of a fundamental doctrine in Christianity: 'I believe myself to be (probably) permanently incapable of believing the Christian scheme of vicarious salvation, and [I am] wedded to a more continuously evolutionary mode of thought'.⁷ He went on to add a clear statement about what he believed he was arguing in the Lectures, and this statement is in accord with Naulty's citation of a passage from *Varieties*:

The mother sea and fountainhead of all religions lie in the mystical experiences of the individual, taking the word mystical in a very wide sense. All theologies and ecclesiasticisms are secondary growths superimposed. . . . I attach the mystical or religious consciousness to the possession of an extended subliminal self, with a thin partition through which messages make irruption. We are thus made convincingly aware of the presence of a sphere of life larger and more powerful than our usual consciousness with which the latter is nevertheless continuous.⁸

Clearly from this passage James believed that the realm of mysticism was separate for the most part from people's psychological dimensions, yet able to enter into those dimensions from time to time.

If it were adequate to leave the matter here, then I would agree with Naulty that James did not reduce mysticism to psychology. The issue, however, must be pursued further, since *the methodology that James insisted must be used to study mysticism was irrefutably psychological and nothing more*. This insight into James helps explain the persuasive tactic that he used in the chapter, 'Religion and Neurology'. By first presenting extreme reductionistic interpretations about the nature of religious life that his audience opposed and that he refuted (those which equated religion to various bodily functions), James 'was able to win a hearing for his own more moderate reductionism. . . . He was also able, continuing the task which belonged to his times and to his own personal vocational development, to emphasize the distinction between physiology and psychology and to make his vigorous claim for the propriety of purely psychological investigation of religious experiences'.⁹ Thus James quoted H. Maudsley in order to conclude that 'not its origin, but *the way in which it works on the whole*, is Dr Maudsley's final test of a belief. This is our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest insist on supernatural origin have also been forced to use in the end. . . . In the end it had to come to our empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots'.¹⁰ He asserted, in essence, that pragmatism was to be the judge of

mystical authenticity, and, as we shall see, his pragmatism was of a distinctly psychological kind.

In his chapter on 'Philosophy', James raised the possibility of establishing a 'science of religions',¹¹ and he returned to this aspiration in the conclusion of his book. When he attempted to formulate hypotheses that would be useful in such a science, he asserted that '[w]e must begin by using less particularized terms; and since one of the duties of the science of religions is to keep religion in connection with the rest of science, we shall do well to seek first of all a way of describing the 'more', which psychologists may also recognize as real. The 'subconscious self' is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required'.¹² The next paragraph of the text is the one that I quoted in my initial article about religion being 'on its *hither* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life'.¹³

Even earlier in the 'Conclusions', James stated clearly that religion was to be studied within a psychological framework, thereby foreshadowing his equation of mystical experience with the subconscious self *for the purposes of study*. After admitting that the 'thoughts' or doctrines of religious traditions vary enormously, he nonetheless contended that '[t]he theories which Religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary; and if you wish to grasp her [sic] essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. . . . This seems to me the first conclusion which we are entitled to draw from the phenomena we have passed in review. The next step is to characterize the feelings. To what psychological order do they belong?'¹⁴ Undoubtedly these and other passages led the prominent Quaker William Littleboy to be 'seriously alarmed' upon his reading of *Varieties*;¹⁵ and they certainly provided the basis for my allegation that James was psychologically reductionistic.

The extent to which Dr Naulty and I disagree on the issue of James' psychological reductionism indicates the conceptual confusion and rambling nature of *Varieties* itself. However important the book was in its time, and however entertaining it is to read, *Varieties* simply cannot serve as a basis for a systematic study of mysticism or religion in general.

QUAKER MYSTICISM AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

I will now consider three of Naulty's assertions. First, I will examine the claim that George Fox's mysticism was real (i.e. was a genuine experience of God). Second, I will consider the related position that Fox's allegedly 'genuine experience of God' was not merely a reflection of a unique socio-political period in English history. Third, I will analyse Naulty's opinion that early Quaker mysticism cannot be explained through a relative deprivation interpretation. The clearest way to proceed is to offer some preliminary comments about relative deprivation theory, show how its concepts appear

dramatically in the writings of prominent early Friends, and then address specifically the question of Fox's mystical claims.

Although details differ slightly among particular relative deprivation theories, the definition of the term given by Faye Crosby captures the basis of them all. For her, relative deprivation is 'a felt grievance resulting from an unfavourable comparison to another person or group regarding the possession of "X"'¹⁶ In addition, people must believe that the achievement of their wishes or aspirations is *feasible*¹⁷—they must think that they have a good chance of getting what they want and deserve—before sociologists apply the term to a given set of circumstances.

Given the importance of a group's belief in the feasibility of its goal-achievement, a group enters a perilous period if members develop grave doubts about the possibility of its eventual success. I call these periods of doubt 'crises of feasibility' because they occur when members of a social movement conclude that they will not be able to satisfy the aspirations that, up until then, they felt they would attain through their collective efforts.¹⁸ Feelings of despair and futility are, of course, possible reactions to these crises, but other responses involve transforming the frustrated aspirations into a religiously millenarian framework. In doing so the frustrated groups now believe that their heretofore frustrated aspirations will still be attained, but through divine intervention. A millenarian interpretation of events is especially likely when the frustrated people operate and think within religious (especially Christian) frameworks. These people are likely to have visions and religious experiences that reinforce their sense of divine mission, and they are likely to issue prophetic warnings against the people or groups whom they believe are their oppressors. This well-defined social pattern explains the cause and the content of early Quaker mysticism.

The Quakers' mysticism emerged out of, and its content reflected, the politically frustrating situation of England in the 1650s. To appreciate this insight, we must look at the period of rising expectations during the English Civil War of the previous decade. Many parliamentary supporters during that struggle believed that, if they were to emerge as victors against the King, then their leaders would institute widespread social, political, and religious reforms. After the parliamentary leaders under Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) attained victory and gained control of the country, however, the anticipated reforms were not legislated. Particularly disappointing was the government's refusal to allow religious worship according to one's conscience, which necessarily would have meant the abolition of the state-supported religious system kept afloat by obligatory tithe payments. The controversial tithe system required, according to parliamentary legislation, that people pay roughly ten per cent of their land value, agricultural yield, or income to either a landowner or (in most cases) the local church minister. The impact on people's livelihood

was significant, if not at times dire, and opposition to the tithe system served as the basis for much of the Quakers' social platform during the 1650s. Moreover, tithe-opposition became the central principle around which Quakers launched a persistent campaign against policies that disadvantaged the poor by favouring the wealthy and powerful. A noted historian of early Quakerism, Barry Reay, has pointed out that, 'for many [people], Quakerism became not only (as [Hugh] Trevor-Roper has observed) "the ghost of decreased Independence", but also a possible haven for those involved in anti-tithe activity in pre-Quaker days. . . . Many Quakers had had a background of anti-tithe activity'.¹⁹

To be concise, people after the English Civil War who had expected important reforms to occur were sorely disappointed with their new leaders. Believing that they had fought for fundamental changes that politicians were now denying them, many of these people experienced crises over whether their leaders would ever put the desired policies in place. Caught in a dilemma of wanting reforms that they now believed were being unjustly denied them by powerful persons in political office and military leadership, these frustrated people developed a unique millenarian ideology in the form of the Quaker faith through which they were able to sustain their hope. In a deeply religious society, Quaker millenarianism emerged out of people's frustration and quickly attracted others who were quickened by its message. God, they believed, would now initiate the fundamental changes that their unscrupulous leaders had promised but withheld.

To verify this pattern, I will let the Quakers speak for themselves, as Naulty suggests I do. Among the clearest early Quaker statements of frustrated reformist aspirations that transformed into religious millenarianism is a 1656 work by George Fox the Younger (d. 1661). (A former parliamentary soldier who converted to Quakerism, Fox was called 'the Younger' so as not to confuse him with his famous namesake.) In an articulate and concise tract to 'the Officers and Soldiers of the Armies in England, Scotland and Ireland', he described himself as one 'who for several yeers [sic] was amongst you, and had a great zeal (as some of you once had) against Tyrants and unjust Laws'.²⁰ Fox the Younger began with a reiteration of the godliness of the parliamentary soldiers and their rebellious cause in the 1640s:

Remember, how at the beginning of the late Wars in these Nations, that many of you were of the lowest of the people according to the accompt [i.e., account] of men, and were poor and contemptible in the eyes of your Enemies. . . . But I bear you Record that then many of you had a zeal for God and against his enemies. . . .²¹

Prominent among the oppressive enemies of the godly were the tithe-receiving ministers:

and. . . some of you were come so far as to see the Priests [i.e., tithe-receiving ministers] to be enemies to the truth, and such as deceived the people, and our zeal waxed hot against them and their Idolotry. . . . [A]nd you saw that the Priests laid heavy burthens [i.e., burdens] upon the people, and oppressed them greatly in forcing them by an unjust Law to give them the tenth of their labours.²²

These righteous soldiers promised God and the people that if they were victorious they would then abolish tithes and other oppressions. For this reason, many citizens supported them:

And then you promised and vowed unto God if he would deliver your Enemies. . . into your hands, that then you would take off that great Oppression which by unjust Laws were laid and continued upon the people. . . . These things you promised and engaged to do, and you caused many people to engage to be true to you, and to stand firm with you, so you might recover their Liberties & outward Rights, and bring them out of bondage in which they were (then) held captives by their Enemies; and upon this Accompt the people furnished you with money & weapons to war against their oppressors. . . .²³

After they won the Civil War, however, the parliamentary soldiers failed to keep their promises:

But now the love of the Lord unto you & the day of your distresse by you is forgotten; and your vows and promises which you made unto God and man are neglected by you, for as great or greater oppression and burthens yet remain upon the people as was then. . . .²⁴

The reason that they had reneged upon their promises was because they had succumbed to their own lusts and personal desires:

what simplicity and tenderness that was once in some of you, is destroyed and murdered by the lusts of the flesh which is highly exalted in you, and that zeal (that was once in some of you for God, and against his enemies, and those unjust Laws which by them were made and upheld) is now lost. . . .²⁵

The soldiers were called upon to repent in their hearts for their unrighteousness, and their repentance would lead them to support immediately the social reforms, such as tithe-abolition, that they had promised:

So come to the Light of Christ in all your consciences. . . and with it search your hearts and trie your waies, and it will shew you your backslidings and the evil of your doings; and repent speedilie and do you first wor[d]s, and return to your integretie, and do violence to no man. . . .²⁶

If, however, the soldiers refused to repent, then (in a typical statement of Quakers' resentment) God would smite them down:

But if you refuse to return unto the Lord. . . and pay your vows to him: Verily the living God will arise and set free the oppressed, and destroy their oppressors. . . , and he will cast you off, and by his own power will he bring you down and destroy you and root you out.²⁷

One could not hope to find a clearer example of relative deprivation, subsequent crisis, and millenarian resolution than this.

Many other Quaker tracts from the early period make similar points about a victorious parliament and army that turned away from their early promises of reform, and which would suffer God's wrath for doing so. In this vein are tracts written by Isaac Pennington, who was one of the people Naulty cited as a Quaker mystic. 'The Account of all the Blood which hath been shed lies somewhere', Pennington warned in 1659. 'Was it [i.e. the Civil War] a thing of Nought? Was it of no Value? Nay, It was precious in the sight of the Lord; many (yea very many) in the singleness and simplicity of their hearts losing their lives for the Cause. And yet how soon had you forgot all this, casting it, and the Cause [of freedom of conscience] behind your backs, and setting up yourselves!'²⁸

Naulty also mentions James Nayler as another Quaker mystic, but he, like Fox the Younger, was a former parliamentary soldier who was deeply disturbed over the victors' political failings. In a tract that Nayler intended to distribute to the members of the Nominated Parliament, he wailed, 'O England! How is thy Expectation failed, now after all thy Travels? The People to whom Oppression and Unrighteousness hath been a Burthen, have long waited for Deliverance, from one Year to another, but none comes, from one Sort of Men to another'.²⁹ This basic lament is repeated, in different words, several times throughout the tract, but in its final passages it gives hope to the oppressed and the despairing:

Wherefore awake, all you to whom Oppression is a Burthen, whom the Proud have trodden upon; and you have been as People without Hope; neither have known any Way to look for Help, for every Man hath become vain. Now arise up out of all your earthly Expectations, and stand up to meet the Lord our Righteousness, who is risen to deliver his People. . . , and to Gather them from among the Heathen, and them that have made a Prey upon them, because they have not known Him, who will save them[?]³⁰

Clearly Nayler believed that politicians' refusal to initiate the long-awaited reforms placed them beyond redemption.

Still another important early Quaker, Edward Burrough, wrote to Cromwell and his officials in 1657:

for you do not relieve the Oppressed, neither do [you] remove Oppressors, as you ought to do, and as the Lord requires of you: What, hath the abundance of this World's glory, and its treasure, quite overcome and stolen away your hearts wholly from all sense and feeling of the unjust Sufferings of your Brethren, who have in times past, as faithfully as your selves, served their Nation with their Lives and Estates, to the purchasing of this Peace and Freedom out of the hands of Opposers; and such may now justly claim the benefit of this Peace and Freedom, and to have a part with you therein, even by Birthright and by Purchase, and also by Promise from some of your selves: But alas! while they have waited for it, and

thought *peaceably to enjoy the same under you*, are many of them *entrapped* into as great Bondage as ever. . . .³¹

To rectify this condition of oppression, Burrough offered to Cromwell and members of the Council of State the following advice: 'And therefore my Friends, let this great Enemy to your Persons, Government, and whole Nation, to wit, *Persecution for Conscience sake*, be speedily removed, lest the Anger of the Lord break forth against you, and repentance be too late'.³² Quakers, in sum, felt that they had a mission from God to warn recalcitrant officials of their imminent damnation unless they instituted the reforms that they had promised the nation.

Fox, who is early Quakerism's best-known figure, participated in these prophetic denunciations. In 1655, for example, he stormed against a litany of perceived ills and burdens. 'O England and the Islands', he thundered, 'and such as be about thee, whose Judges judgeth for rewards, and Priests [i.e. ministers] preach for hire [i.e. tithes], and Prophets prophesie for money, and whose Divines [i.e. preachers] divine for money . . . for this cause is England on heaps, as Jerusalem became'. Later in the same piece he demanded, 'Away with all such that take Tythes from poor people, and get treble [i.e. triple] damanges if they will not pay them', and he repeated similar charges and demanded appropriate remedies in other tracts.³³

Fox's clearest statement of political frustration and reformist hopes appeared in a 1659 statement directed *To the Parliament of the Comon-wealth [sic] of England*. . . . As had other Quakers, Fox reiterated the hopes for reforms that he and others had invested in Parliament's struggle against the King, and then stated his sorrowful condemnation of the government for not having kept its political promises. 'Friends', he began:

It is acknowledged that the Lord God. . . hath done great and honourable things by you. . . , insomuch that many mountains have been abased, and many sturdy oakes have been cut done, and many cruel Lawes have been made void, and even the way of the Lord, and the way of the coming of his Kingdom hath seemed to be prepared. . . . [And] there have been many fair promises and pretenses made by many of you, like as if the kingdom of Jesus had been at our door, ready to have entered in[to] our Nations, whereby many good hopes we have had to have been made [sic] a perfect free people ere this day. . . , and that we might have sitten [sic] together in peace and unity, and in freedom from all oppressions of our enemies.

But alas, alas, this Glorious work of Reformation hath been interrupted before our eye[s], and the precious buds and good appearance of Glorious fruits hath withered and blasted in our sight, so that our good hopes hath perished, and our Freedom hath been intercepted, through the evil doing of many unfaithful men. . . . [C]louds of darkness hath overshadowed [sic] the Nations again, and the good hopes of the faithful people have been drawn backwards, and the Reformation stopped, and your own vowes promises and pretenses have remained unfulfilled, and we are yet an oppressed people.³⁴

Following this lament about Parliament's unwillingness to fulfill its Civil War promises, Fox offered it a fifty-nine point programme of the reforms that he felt would have set the nation aright. Along with his religious contemporaries, Fox shared feelings of anger and deep disappointment over unfulfilled political and social reforms, and these feelings of disparity between aspirations and reality demonstrate clearly what sociologists call 'relative deprivation'. These feelings, moreover, were central to his religious expression, as seen in both his writings and his actions.

Having located Fox and other important Quaker contemporaries within the socio-political context of their age, we now turn to another issue about which Naulty and I have widely differing interpretations—was Fox a mystic, a prophet, or both? While I see no reason for viewing Fox as anyone more than a charismatic prophet, Naulty suggests that he also deserves a place within a long and venerable line of mystics. Of course many persons before Naulty have argued similarly, not the least of whom is the respected historian of Puritanism, Geoffrey Nuttall. Nuttall insisted, for example, that for Fox and several other prominent people from the 1650s, 'the Divine presence and the sense of being caught up in God's love in Christ are prime factors in their religious experience'.³⁵

I do not dismiss lightly either his or Naulty's mystical claims for Fox, but dismiss them I must, at least with regard to their social scientific utility. Furthermore, I do so because they rest on the assumptions that Christianity is, in essence, true, and that Christ is the Son of God with whom one can have personal, mystical contact. A sociologist could offer an alternative to these assumptions by pointing out that Christianity itself began as a response to widespread and deep currents of relative deprivation amongst Palestinian Jews, and that perhaps Jesus was not the messianic deliverer that many of his followers believed him to be. Feelings of relative deprivation—first over Jesus's failed messianic mission and then over his failure to initiate his 'second coming'—are at the heart of the Christian religious tradition.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY

The relative deprivationist interpretation of early Christianity that first appeared in 1975 was an act of intellectual courage, since, as the author realized, '[a] combination of theological, cultural, and historical factors has conspired to create a protected enclave for this particular religion'.³⁶ Writing at a time when both academic and popular publications were flooded with analyses of new, strange, sectarian groups and their charismatic, messianic leaders, the author of this innovative New Testament study, John Gager, had:

become fascinated with the prospect of reexamining early Christianity in light of modern religious movements that have flourished, so to speak, in the laboratories of sociologists and anthropologists. Increasingly, I became convinced that insights

drawn from the study of these movements were not only applicable to early Christianity but also, and more significantly, that they held the promise of a genuinely new understanding of this particular religion.³⁷

Part of this 'genuinely new understanding' was the identification of relative deprivation as a vital force in the lives of early Christians.

Gager's deprivationist interpretation of early Christianity appears in a chapter subsection called, appropriately, 'Earliest Christianity as a Millenarian Movement'. He begins the chapter by pointing out the New Testament origins for the titles of two classic studies of cargo cults,³⁸ and then mentions the passing references to the millenarian nature of early Christianity that appear in the works of the anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace, and the cultural historians Norman Cohn and Yonina Talmon.³⁹ Using Talmon's definition of relative deprivation as an "*uneven relation between expectation and the means of satisfaction*", Gager concludes that '[t]his concept of relative deprivation sheds light on several important aspects of earliest Christianity'.⁴⁰ These aspects include its prepolitical character, the participation in it of persons who were *above* the lowest social strata, and its necessary location 'within the tradition of apocalyptic Judaism, which itself represents a paradigm case of great expectations followed by repeated disappointments'.⁴¹ A few pages further, Gager undertakes an extended analysis of both conversion to early Christianity and the early movement's missionary efforts according to the deprivationist-related (and somewhat dated) theory of cognitive dissonance.⁴²

Gager's study suggests that at the foundation of Christianity is a religious vision whose content derives from social and political disadvantage and despair. While he adroitly avoids reflecting on the nature of religious vision among Jesus' disciplines, he suggestively mentions, 'there are some indications that some of his own followers saw in him the fulfilment of their political dreams. . . . [A] remarkable passage in Luke 24:21 reports the following lament of two disciples after Jesus' death: "We had hoped that he was the one to redeem [i.e. purify, liberate, and restore] Israel"'.⁴³ After his death and the additional failure of the expected millenarian arrival, members of the Christian community probably convinced themselves that they had achieved partial fulfilment of their expectations, using such 'standard forms [as] sacraments, meditation, asceticism, and mystical visions',⁴⁴ along with 'a form of therapy' provided by the Book of Revelations.⁴⁵

If true, then Gager's analysis supports, in dramatic fashion, my proposal that relative deprivation provides a conceptually adequate tool to explain religious mysticism.⁴⁶ It also reinforces my opinion that the continued non-fulfilment of Christian millennialist dreams places relative deprivation at the heart of that particular faith. How, or even *if*, this insight could help explain the reputed mysticism of Blaise Pascal and Bernard of Clairvaux I cannot say,

since I claim no expertise on these people. Naulty, however, places great stock in their mystical ventures, even, however, if his appreciation of Bernard's social context is romantic.

Naulty puts forward the claim that 'St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) is an important counter-instance to Kent, since Bernard's mysticism is of the same kind as that of Fox and the early Quakers, and St Bernard represents Western Christianity in a triumphant, expansionist phase, whereas Fox and his disciples were struggling to emerge from an embattled persecuted phase'. This claim, however, is inconsistent with Naulty's own acknowledgement that Bernard recruited vigorously for the Second Crusade, and this fact should have motivated Naulty to investigate the military events that necessitated the call.

Far from being a phase of Western expansionism, Christendom was suffering grievously under the sword of the Turks. Roughly two decades after successfully invading Syria and Asia Minor in 1071, the Turks, with assistance from the Hungarians, massacred a substantial portion of Christianity's first crusaders. Even though the first Crusade ultimately proved successful with the recapture of Edessa (1097), Antioch (1098), and Jerusalem (1099), Pope Eugene III (with Bernard's help) had to call a second Crusade in 1144 when Edessa fell back into Turkish hands.⁴⁷ Bernard's own interpretation of these threatening events stressed that they were God's punishment for the Christians' sins, but that He [sic] provided them 'with a means of salvation through the crusade'.⁴⁸ While I shall not try to explain the Second Crusade through a contrived application of relative deprivation theory, suffice it to say that the religious 'mysticism' of the period would be fruitfully interpreted against the social backdrop of these momentous military and cultural events.

Although Naulty views the matter differently, I see little relationship between the devastation that the Christian armies suffered in this crusade and our discussion about Bernard's reputed mysticism—*except* on one point. Bernard's rationalizations for the armies' failures reveal a pattern used by many frustrated people whose expectations suffer defeat. 'The reward of our warfare is not of (this) earth, not from below', Bernard propounded, 'its prize is far away and from the uttermost lands'.⁴⁹

Of considerable importance is Naulty's belief that 'St Bernard of Clairvaux was a mystic of the same type' as early Quakers—'a love mystic'. Naulty's assumption is that the reality of mysticism is true since it appears in similar form across a considerable span of time and cultures. Associating, however, Bernard and the Quakers as 'love mystics' is peculiar for several reasons, two of which have to do with an appreciation of early Quaker history itself.

First, the early Quakers themselves took great pains *not* to be religiously associated with the Catholics—the very thing that Naulty is doing. They had both social and theological reasons for doing so, and they denied with

persistent zeal any spiritual or worldly connections between themselves and the Church from Rome.⁵⁰ George Fox and nine other prominent Quakers, for example, published (probably in 1655) a book entitled *A Declaration Against all Poperie and Popish Points*,⁵¹ and Fox followed it one year later with another publication, unabashedly titled *A Warning from the Lord to the Pope and to all His Train of Idolatries: with a Discovery of his false Imitations, and Likenesses, and Traditional Inventions, which is not the Power of God. And a Testimony against his foundation, to the overthrow of the whole Building: and a Witness by the Spirit of God against his Dead-Worship of Dead Idols; and the false Imitation of false Crosses, which is not the power of God unto Salvation, but delusion unto damnation*.⁵² In sum, the early Quakers themselves rejected the very thing upon which Naulty insists—that they and the Catholics were ‘of the same type’ of mystics.

The second reason why I question Naulty’s unified classification of Quaker and Catholic mysticism is that a renowned writer on mysticism, Evelyn Underhill, specifically separated the two ‘mystical’ experiences. ‘[N]o Quaker teacher creates the impression which we receive, e.g. from St Augustine, Ruysbroeck, or St John of the Cross, of the soul’s entrance into a supernatural order “above reason but not against reason” which exceeds the resources of speech’. She added that ‘the Absolute is truly self-revealed under symbols; in [the Quaker] case, the negative symbols of ineffable Being, in the [Catholic], the homely and positive signs of a manifested and self-giving love’.⁵³ No reason exists why we should accept Underhill’s word over Naulty’s, but this basic disagreement between two students of mysticism who are writing about the same groups suggests how impressionistic many of the discussions are about the topic. Laden with metaphors, frequently divorced from social and cultural context, and reliant upon consciously composed tracts, mystical determinations of individuals and groups remain uneven and unreliable.⁵⁴

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE RISE OF SUFISM

Among the individuals and groups that Naulty presents in an attempt to refute my claims, only the Sufis arose and flourished in a predominantly non-Christian culture. As Naulty sees them, ‘the Sufis were persecuted because they were mystics, not mystics because they were persecuted’, and Naulty cites work from the respected Islamicist, Annemarie Schimmel, to support the contention that they demonstrated ‘love mysticism’ (akin to the Quakers). Presumably Sufism is supposed to be one example of ‘closely similar forms of mysticism [that] occur in cultures in which relative deprivation is absent’. No historical documentation, however, is cited to support the assertion about Sufism flourishing in populations in which relative deprivation was absent, and in fact the evidence suggests otherwise. Relative deprivation contributed

to Sufism's very appearance, and then the religious movement spread amongst groups whose members felt politically or socially disprivileged.

The precise origins of Sufism are obscure, and scholars do not overlook the ascetic tendencies within both the theology of the Koran and the life of the Prophet. The first groups, however, to translate these tendencies into ideological doctrine seem to have been reacting against the tyrannical but luxurious rule of the Ummayyads (i.e. members of the Prophet's tribe) who dominated Islam after the assassination of Ali in 661. After discussing, for example, the possible influence that Muhammad himself might have had on the emergence of Sufism, Kenneth Cragg indicates that 'a further factor in the emergence of the Sufis was revulsion at the moral laxities and luxuries of the Umayyad Caliphate in its metropolis at Damascus, compromises which . . . were dismaying enough to provoke political unrest and theological questioning'.⁵⁵ Likewise, an early study of Sufism indicates that '[a] further reason for the adoption of a life of asceticism is to be found in the political condition of the period immediately following the reigns of the first four *khalifas* [successors to Muhammed]. For there were many pious Muslims who, becoming disgusted with the tyrannical and impious rule of the Ummayyad *Khalifas*, withdrew from the world to seek peace of soul in a life of seclusion'.⁵⁶ Finally, Annemarie Schimmel, in the same study that Naulty cites, informs us that the 'ascetic tendencies' which led to Sufism emerged out of '[t]he resistance of the pious circles to the government'. This resistance:

grew stronger and was expressed in theological debates about the right ruler of the faithful and the conditions for the leadership of the community. The negative attitude toward the government engendered during these decades has significantly shaped the feeling of the pious throughout the history of Islam; the Sufis would often equate 'government' with 'evil'.⁵⁷

Those who specialize in early Islamic affairs are more capable than me in identifying the precise political and theological factors at work here, but it appears that a considerable number of the Muslims who became the earliest Sufis had expectations about both politics and the direction of their faith that were not being satisfied by members of their theocratic polity. In sociological language, the earliest Sufis suffered relative deprivation.

Given the social conditions under which it originated, it is not surprising that Sufism's greatest popular appeal was to the disprivileged segments of Islam. We know, for example, that popular Iranian Sufism by the late 8th century reflected 'the tension between requirements for spiritual salvation, as specified by Sufi mystical philosophy, enjoining both avoidance and transcendence of this world, and the vociferous demands of the mass of the lay members of Sufi congregations for this-worldly action. Because of these demands, any religious movement was likely to become "politically conditioned" to a significant

degree'.⁵⁸ Popular Sufism, therefore, nurtured millenarian political action, especially millenarianism that focused on the return of the *Mahdi*—Shi'ite Islam's messianic figure. As Said Arjomand's impressive study of Iranian Islam indicates, 'by admitting the possibility of immediate contact with God, [Sufism] provided a fertile ground for the growth of undisciplined religiosity, and heightened the receptivity to apocalyptic and 'exaggerated' claims to mahdihood and (incarnation), similar to those found in the history of Shi'ism. . . .'⁵⁹

In 18th-century India we also see how the receptivity of the population to Sufi-influenced mysticism was conditioned by dire political and social circumstances. Our source for this information is, again, Annemarie Schimmel. She tells us that:

[j]ust as the new spirit of Urdu poetry developed in 18th-century Delhi, while the leading mystics looked for ways to lead their followers out of the darkness of the political situation, thus in Sind, too, the 18th century can be called the most important period for the formation of mystical poetry and prose, and for the activities of saintly persons whose works were meant to give spiritual nourishment to the suffering people. Thus, the 18th century, politically perhaps the most saddening phase of Indo-Muslim civilization, proves to be the most fertile period in terms of religious literature—very similar to the situation in the 13th century, when the larger part of the Islamic Empire was devastated by the Mongol hordes, and yet the greatest mystical poetry and theory was produced between Cairo and India: it is as though a strange balance of power produces such effects'.⁶⁰

Sociologists of religion, however, believe they know the nature of that 'strange balance of power'—it is society itself, whose religions provide both hope for a divinely inspired salvation and relief to those who feel like pawns in large and destructive political dramas. Whether through other-worldly mysticism or this-worldly apocalypticism, salvational religion embodies the aspirations of people who often are caught in social forces over which they have little control and often cannot even influence. Mysticism, in sum, is a social product, and the extent that cross-cultural similarities exist simply reflects the recurrent plight of disprivileged humanity.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF MYSTICISM

To argue as I have that religious mysticism is purely a social product is *not* to commit the sociological equivalent of James' psychological reductionism. Unlike James' claims, the sociological argument conceptualizes both the actors' particularistic facts and the experts' historical interpretations into comparative patterns from which predictions can be made. We can predict, for example, that when disprivileged people who think in religious terms experience political frustration regarding their socio-political aspirations, then outbreaks of millenarian mysticism are likely to occur. When studying these

cases, therefore, scholars should pay particular attention to the social climate in which mysticism appears. Otherwise we overlook the social causes that provide the context for the mystical visions and the messages that the mystics convey.

For their part, sociologists of religion may wish to direct more attention to the study of mysticism per se, since the phenomenon can be well integrated into established sociological literature on the development of religious concepts about God. Robert Bellah's application, for example, of 'the evolutionary idea to religion', provides a framework for seeing mysticism in a developmental perspective. Bellah stresses that '[i]t is not the ultimate conditions [of humans' lives] or, in traditional language, God that has evolved, [n]or is it man in the broadest sense of *homo religiosus*'. It is, rather, 'religion as symbol system' that changes in identifiable patterns,⁶¹ and these changes often represent themselves in new mystical visions.

Note clearly, however, that I follow Bellah in avoiding the question of the true nature of God. By insisting on a sociological interpretation of mysticism, I am neither denying nor affirming the Divine's existence. I *am* saying that what people believe are godly experiences, and most certainly those godly experiences that occur under conditions of pressing social strain, are more wisely interpreted as their own reified hopes. Such an interpretation says nothing about either the existence of, or the true nature of, 'the Divine', since about such topics sociology must remain respectfully silent.

NOTES

- 1 I was not able to ascertain whether Naulty actually is a religious studies professor, but Naulty's arguments are the type that reflect a religious studies perspective. They provide, consequently, an excellent opportunity for dialogue between religious studies and sociology.
- 2 Stephen A. Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations of Early Quakerism: William James and Rufus Jones', *Religion* 17 (1987), p. 254.
- 3 Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252, 266, see 262–266.
- 4 Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252–253, 265–266.
- 5 Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', p. 266.
- 6 Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252–253.
- 7 Henry James (ed.), *The Letters of William James I*, Atlantic Monthly Press, pp. 149–150; rpt. in Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (eds), *William James on Psychical Research*, New York, Viking Press, 1960, p. 264.
- 8 *Psychical Research*, pp. 264–265.
- 9 James E. Dittes, 'Beyond William James', in Charles Y. Glock and Phillip E. Hammond (eds), *Beyond the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion*, New York, Harper & Row, 1973.
- 10 William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 19–20, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902, p. 19–20, rpt. with revisions, 1910 (emphasis in the original).
- 11 James, *Varieties*, p. 455.

- 12 James, *Varieties*, p. 511.
- 13 James, *Varieties*, p. 512 (original emphasis); Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', p. 255.
- 14 James, *Varieties*, p. 504. Worth mentioning, too, are James' comments about 'Pragmatism and Religion', which appeared as a chapter in his 1907 study on the pragmatic perspective. 'On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the work, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths'. After, however, modestly referring to his earlier study of 'man's religious experience' (i.e. *Varieties*), he asks that 'you will perhaps exempt my own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe'. Once again we see the inescapable ambiguity between James' intent and his methodology. (William James, *Pragmatism, and Four Essays from 'The Meaning of Truth'*, p. 192, New York, Meridian, 1907 rpt., 1955.)
- 15 The Quaker Collection, Haverford College Library, Collection no. 1130, Box 3 Letters 1899–1902. Folder: Letters to [Rufus M. Jones], 1902. [John Wilhelm Rowntree to Jones, 11 December 1902]; cited in Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', p. 256.
- 16 Faye Crosby, 'A Model of Egotistical Relative Deprivation', *Psychological Review* 83: 2 (1976), p. 90.
- 17 W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966, p. 10.
- 18 Stephen A. Kent, 'Puritan Radicalism and the New Religious Organizations', in *Comparative Social Research* 10, Greenwich, Connecticut, JAI Press, 1987, pp. 11, 13, 22; 'Slogan Chanters to Mantra Chanters: A Mertonian Deviance Analysis of Conversion to Religiously Ideological Organizations in the Early 1970s'. *Sociological Analysis* 49: 2 (1988), pp. 104–118.
- 19 Barry Reay, 'Quaker Opposition to Tithes 1652–1660', *Past and Present* 86 (February, 1980), p. 100; see Bruce Gordon Blackwood, 'Agrarian Unrest and the Early Lancashire Quakers', *Journal of the Friends Historical Society* 51: 1 (1965), pp. 72–76; Stephen A. Kent, 'Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilization: A Study of Early Quakerism', *British Journal of Sociology* 33: 4 (December, 1982), pp. 529–544. A concise and balanced overview of studies on early Quakerism is in H. Larry Ingle, 'From Mysticism to Radicalism: Recent Historiography of Quaker Beginnings', *Quaker History* 76: 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 79–94.
- 20 George Fox the Younger, *Compassion to the Captives . . .*, containing *Unto you the Officers and Soldiers of the Armies in England, Scotland and Ireland*, London, Thomas Simmons, 1656, p. 16. The pattern of movement from the ranks of the parliamentary army to the ranks of Quakerism is well known and easily understandable, given the soldiers' frustration over the government's refusal to initiate the expected reforms for which the soldiers believed they had risked their lives in battle. Margaret E. Hirst's *The Quakers in Peace and War* (New York, George H. Doran Co., 1923, pp. 527–529) lists ninety-two Quakers who had been either soldiers or seamen during the Civil War, all but five of whom had been parliamentarians. Friends House Library, London, has more complete lists of seamen and soldiers who converted to Quakerism in its 'Index of Occupations'. The index names at least twenty seamen who converted, but does not indicate how many of them fought in the Civil War. All but a few, however, of the one hundred and

seventy-eight soldiers in its records fought in the parliamentary army. Many more converts were former soldiers, but they simply are not named. See, for example, the numerous citations under 'soldiers convinced' in the index to George Fox, *The Journal of George Fox* (ed.), Norman Penney, New York, Octagon, 1694, rpt. 1911, 1975; C. H. Firth and Godfrey Davies, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2 volumes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, pp. 134, 234–235, 247–248, 258, 272, 394–395, 440, 493, 503, 656–657, and 659. General George Monck, commander of the English army in Scotland during the 1650s, considered Quakers among his troops to be potential mutineers, and therefore cashiered as many of them as he could. Quakers, no doubt like the Levellers and the Agitators during the late 1640s, were thought to be a threat to army discipline. As Firth and Davies indicate, 'Monck entirely agreed with [Colonel William] Daniel that Quakers were "neither fitt to command or obey, but ready to make a distraction in the army, and a mutiny uppon every slight occasion"' (quoted in Firth and Davies, *Regimental History*, pp. 493–494).

- 21 Fox The Younger, *Unto you the Officers and Soldiers*, p. 10.
- 22 Ibid., p. 10.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
- 24 Ibid., p. 11.
- 25 Ibid., p. 12.
- 26 Ibid., p. 14.
- 27 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
- 28 Isaac Pennington the Younger, *To the Parliament, the Army, and all the Well-affected in the Nation, who have been faithful to the Good Old Cause*, [no page number], London, Giles Calvert, 1659; see also *To the ARMY* 1659, Folio, rpt. in *The Works of . . . Isaac Pennington . . .* Vol. I, pp. 330–331, 3rd edn, London, James Phillips, 1784.
- 29 James Nayler, *A Lamentation (By One of England's Prophets,) over the Ruins of this Oppressed Nation* (1653/4), rpt. in *A Collection of sundry Books, Epistles and Papers written by James Nayler*, p. 99, London, J. Sowle, 1716.
- 30 Nayler, *A Lamentation*, in *A Collection*, p. 107. An additional example of a deprivationist statement by Quakers appears in Anonymous, *To the Generals, and Captains, Officers, and Souldiers of this present Army. . . .*, p. 1, London, no publisher, 1658. The authors refer to themselves as 'The Faithful Friends of this Common-wealth, and well-wishers for the Peace and good Government thereof, who have undergone many great Battels (with you) for the purchasing [of] Peace and Freedom in the Temporal and Spiritual liberties in the body and Spirit. . . .' They go on to lament, 'what oppression by Tithes, and what oppression in the Laws doth abound, what oppressions are there abounding through the Lawyers, and through unjust Judges? Even the whole land mourns under it, and was it not in your hearts once to have Corrected and Regulated these things'.
- 31 Edward Burrough, *To the Protector and Council* (1657), published in *Good Counsel and Advice Rejected by Disobedient Men. . .*, rpt. in *The Memorable Works. . . of Edward Burroughs*, p. 563, London, no publisher, 1672, pp. 551–583 (emphasis in original).
- 32 Burrough, *To the Protector and Council*, in *Works*, p. 564 (emphasis in original).
- 33 George Fox, *A Warning to the World*, (1655), pp. 5–8; quoted in Geoffrey F. Nuttall, 'Overcoming the World: The Early Quaker Programme', p. 151, in Derek Baker (ed.), *Studies in Church History 10: Sanctity and Secularity: The Church and the World*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973, pp. 145–164. For highlights of Fox's

- social and political demands, see Barry Reay, 'The Quakers, 1659, and the Restoration of the Monarchy', *History* 53 (1978), pp. 193, 195; W. Schenk, *The Concern for Social Justice in the Puritan Revolution*, Toronto, Longmans, Green & Co., 1948, pp. 121, 122, 124.
- 34 George Fox, *To the Parliament of the Comon-Wealth of England, Fifty-nine Particulars laid down for the Regulating things, and the taking away of Oppressing Laws, and Oppressors, and to ease the Oppressed*, London, Thomas Simmons, 1659.
- 35 Geoffrey F. Nuttall, 'Puritan and Quaker Mysticism', *Theology* (October, 1975), p. 525.
- 36 John Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1975, p. xi.
- 37 Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, p. xi.
- 38 The cargo cult studies are Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound. A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia*, 2nd Augmented Edn, New York, Schocken, 1968 (from 1 Cor. 15:48-52: 'Behold, I show you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, [for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.]'); and Kenelm Burridge, *New Heaven New Earth*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969 (from Rev. 21.1: 'And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven, and the first earth were passed away, and there was no more sea'). Worth mentioning is that Burridge summarized the conversion story of the famous Quaker, James Naylor, on p. 3, and later (in a section on the sexual attractiveness of male prophets to women) stated that he 'is surely more properly evaluated as a prophet in terms of the millenarian atmosphere that accompanied the victories of the Parliamentary armies—in which he had served and fought with distinction—than by the fact that women extolled the beauty of his eyes and found him sexually attractive' (p. 161).
- 39 Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, p. 20; citing Anthony F. C. Wallace, 'Revitalization Movements', *American Anthropologist* 58 (1956), p. 267 ('Both Christianity and Mohammedanism [sic]. . . originated as revitalization movements'); Norman Cohn, 'Medieval Millenarism [sic]: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements', p. 33 in Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed.), *Millennial Dreams in Action: Studies in Revolutionary Religious Movements*, New York, Schocken, 1970 ('for many of its early adherents Christianity was just such a [millenarian] movement'); and Yonina Talmon, 'Medieval Millenarianism: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements', p. 33, in Sylvia Thrupp (ed.), *Millennial Dreams in Action. Studies in Revolutionary Religious Movements*, New York, Schocken, 1970.
- 40 Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, p. 27, quoting Talmon, 'Pursuit of the Millennium', p. 137 (her emphasis). Gager also mentions the utility of relative deprivation theory for New Testament studies in 'Shall We Marry Our Enemies? Sociology and the New Testament', *Interpretation* 36 (1982), pp. 262-263; and see his review essay on three early Christianity books in *Religious Studies Review*, 5: 3 (July, 1979), p. 180. In contrast to Gager, I am among those persons who believe that 'social scientific analysis of the New Testament somehow poses a threat to the authority of Scripture and thus to faith itself' ('Shall We Marry Our Enemies? . . .', p. 257). See, however, Charles L. McGehee, 'Spiritual Values and Sociology: When We Have Debunked Everything, What Then?', *The American Sociologist* 17 (February, 1982), pp. 40-46.
- 41 Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, pp. 27-28. In the same year Gager was insisting

- 49 Bernard quoted in Constable, 'The Second Crusade', p. 267.
- 50 For discussions about how the Quakers' opponents associated them with Catholics as part of a diabolically subversive plot, see Stephen A. Kent, 'The "Papist" Charges Against the Interregnum Quakers', *Journal of Religious History* 12: 2 (December, 1982), pp. 180-190; and Ian Y. Thackray, 'Zion Undermined: The Protestant Belief in a Popish Plot during the English Interregnum', *History Workshop* 18 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 28-52.
- 51 George Fox, Francis Howgil, Edward Burrough, Alexander Parker, Thomas Aldam, Anthony Pearson, Gervase Benson, Thomas Rawlinson, Robert Rich [and] Robert Dring, *A Declaration Against all Poperies and Popish Points. . . .*, no place or printer, no date [but probably 1655], listed in Joseph Smith, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Friends' Books. . . .*, p. 649, New York, Krause, 1867, rpt. 1970.
- 52 Listed in Smith, *A Descriptive Catalogue*, p. 651.
- 53 Evelyn Underhill, *Worship*, p. 313, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1936 rpt., 1957.
- 54 I shall not attempt to review the vast literature on mysticism, nor try to write a history of the efforts to systematize its reputed forms in order to facilitate its comparative study. Suffice it to say that the continued veneration given to conceptually unclear works such as James' *Varieties* hinders these efforts.
- 55 Kenneth Cragg, *The House of Islam*, p. 66, Encino, California, Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975.
- 56 John A. Subhan, *Sufism: Its Saints and Shrines*, p. 10, 1938 [?], rpt. 1970, New York, Samuel Weiser. A more popular account of Islam by *Time-Life Books* also states that '[i]n effect, [Sufism] was a reaction, not only against the rationalists, but against a tyrannical government seemingly supported by orthodox religious leaders'. (Desmond Stewart and the Editors of *Time-Life Books*, *Early Islam*, New York, Time Incorporated, 1967, pp. 86-87). Finally, the Islamicist F. E. Peters says, cryptically, about the origins of Sufism that 'the deeds of the civil war [against the Ummayyads] brought Muslims to introspection. . . .' (*Allah's Commonwealth*, p. 416, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1973.)
- 57 Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1975, pp. 29-30.
- 58 Said Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*, pp. 67-68, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984; see also J. Spencer Irmingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 94, 111, 238-241, 253.
- 59 Arjomand, p. 67, see p. 82.
- 60 Annemarie Schimmel, *Pain and Grace: A Study of Two Mystical Writers of Eighteenth-Century Muslim India*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1976, pp. 26-27.
- 61 Robert Bellah, 'Religious Evolution', p. 21 in Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1970; also see Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology*, Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1987, pp. 90, 195-199. In his wordy essay, 'Religion as a Cultural System', Clifford Geertz unknowingly uses a relative deprivation framework to discuss how religious symbols in part account for 'the gap between things as they are and as they ought to be' as well as 'the gap between what we deem various individuals deserve and what we see that they get'. See Geertz, 'Religion as a Cultural System', in M. Banton (ed.), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, London, Tavistock Publication, 1966; rpt. in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books, 1973, p. 106.